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1. Introduction 
Stealth technology of aircraft, known as one of the three technological revolutions together 
with high-energy laser weapons and cruise missiles in the development history of military 
science since 1980s, has become the third milestone after jet engines and swept wings 
technology in modern aviation history. Stealth aircraft has been also considered as one of 
the ten greatest inventions of the U.S. ADARPA (Defense Advance Research Project 
Agency). Nowadays, stealth technology has become one key technology. The countries all 
over the world have paid great attention and strived to develop the stealth technology. 
Reasonable assessment method for stealth performance plays a crucial role in the 
development of advanced stealth technology. For example, the result of the stealth 
performance assessment of aircraft can provide reference for modifying the aircraft’s stealth 
design to achieve a higher stealth performance. Meanwhile, it can also provide reference for 
making some specific strategies to increase the probability of successful tasks by reducing 
the detecting probability of the radar or radar network. Nowadays, the electronic battlefield 
is becoming more complex and it is urgent to build up a new method to analyze the multi-
azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic integrated stealth performance of aircraft, under the 
complex electronic environment. 
The existing stealth performance assessment methods include two types. One is the static 
stealth performance assessment method, the other is the stealth assessment method based 
on the effectiveness of combat simulation. The former just uses the average RCS value of 
target circumferential area, or that of some critical radar detecting areas, under some 
important radar frequencies as the basis. And the latter uses aircraft’s survival probability 
(including detection probability, hitting probability and damage probability) in specific 
combat tasks as the basis to assess the stealth performance of aircraft. Each method can 
reflect the characteristics of the target’s stealth performance well. However, there are still 
some limitations such as: the results based on the two methods can’t reflect the impact on 
aircraft stealth performance caused by different target scattering characteristics. As not 
taking the certain combat task and detecting environment into consideration, the results also 
fail to reflect the dynamic characteristics of stealth performance, which happens in the entire 
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proceeding of different combat tasks of aircraft, and the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency 
integrated stealth performance under complex electronic environment. According to the 
above, the development of modern stealth technology urgently requires a new type of 
stealth performance assessment method to provide the reliable basis. 
In this paper, a new type assessment method for multi-azimuth and multi-frequency 
dynamic integrated stealth performance of aircraft was established by building the multi-
azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic integrated stealth performance assessment models 
and the series of assessment criteria. With these efforts, on the one hand, a more reasonable 
analysis result of stealth performance based on the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency 
dynamic detecting environment can be provided, on the other hand, the limitations of the 
existing stealth performance assessment methods can be overcame. 
2. The existing stealth performance assessment method 
Although lots of countries home and abroad started researches about the stealth 
technology early, there are just only a few assessment methods for stealth performance of 
aircraft. One of the two main existing methods is static stealth performance assessment 
method, the other is the stealth performance assessment method based on the 
effectiveness of combat. 
2.1 The static stealth performance assessment method 
2.1.1 The theory of the static stealth performance assessment 
The classical static stealth performance assessment method includes two aspects: one is 
the static testing assessment method and the other is theoretical calculation assessment 
method. The American scholar Knott E.F has made a number of deep studies into the 
radar cross section calculation and testing technologies. Chinese scholars, such as 
Ruanying Zheng, Kao Zhang, Dongli Ma and so on, also have done researches on radar 
cross section calculation and testing, they propose the concept of critical RCS reduction 
region of aircraft, which has been widely used. At present, the radar cross section testing 
technology home and abroad has been used widely. The static radar cross section testing 
is a method, by doing the outfield or laboratory RCS testing on made full-scale models or 
reduce-scale models to get a basic understanding of the target scattering characteristics. 
The existing methods of the radar cross section theoretical calculation mainly include 
three types and they are the high frequency approximation, finite difference time domain 
and finite difference time domain. 
The detailed steps of static stealth performance assessment are as follows: First of all, 
obtaining the RCS curve of the target under different radar detecting frequencies through 
static testing method or theoretical calculation method, then analyzing the stealth 
performance of aircraft, according to the average RCS of target circumferential area, or that 
of some critical radar detecting area, or the RCS value of certain radar detecting azimuth, 
under some important radar frequencies. 
The assessment criteria of the static stealth performance assessment method is that the lower 
the average RCS of target circumferential area, or that of some critical radar detecting area, 
or the RCS of specific azimuth, under some important radar frequencies, the better the 
stealth performance of aircraft has. Technology flow chart of the static stealth performance 
assessment method is shown as Fig.1. 
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Fig. 1. Flow Chart of Static Stealth performance Assessment Method 
The overall average RCS of both model one and model two is 0.5㎡. There are three RCS 
curve peaks at 30  and 180  azimuth for model one. The maximum value of RCS curve 
peak is 10 ㎡ and the azimuth-width is 4°. There are four RCS curve peaks at 
45  , 135 and 225 azimuth. The maximum value of RCS curve peak is 20㎡ and its peak 
azimuth takes up 4° as well. 
A penetration testing is carried out in this section. The locations of every single radar in the 
radar network and the penetration destination are shown in Table 1, where GR means single 
radar and Basement stands for the penetration destination. The penetration testing angle is 
set from 060 to 060  and the interval angles is 5 . 
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Fig. 2. Circumferential scattering distributions of model one 
 
 
Fig. 3. Circumferential scattering distributions of model two 
 
Name GR1 GR2 GR3 GR4 GR5 GR6 GR7 Basement 
Longitude 119.6330 121.550 120.4830 121.5330 121.6170 121.05 121.9667 121.5 
Latitude 23.5667 24.0667 22.70 25.0330 24.0167 25.0667 24.8 25.0 
Table 1. Locations of Each Single Radar and the Penetration Destination 
Fig.4 to Fig.7 just show several simulation results of these two models. The Y axis of the 
testing diagram the FoundValue stands for the radar network detection results. When 
FoundValue is equal to 0, it means that no target has been found by radar network. When 
FoundValue is equal to 1, it means the target has been found. The X axis of the diagram the 
Time stands for the time length of the penetration testing process. Fig (a) is the radar 
detection results of simulation model one and Fig (b) is the radar detection results of 
simulation model two.  
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(a)                                      (b) 
Fig. 4. Simulation results comparison of model one and model two (penetration angle -60°) 
 
 
(a)                                      (b) 
Fig. 5. Simulation results comparison of model one and model two (penetration angle -45°) 
 
 
(a)                                      (b) 
Fig. 6. Simulation results comparison of model one and model two (penetration angle 0°) 
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(a)                                      (b) 
Fig. 7. Simulation results comparison of model one and model two (penetration angle 15°) 
It can be seen from the results that although the overall average RCS of the two simulation 
models is 0.5㎡, the dynamic stealth performance of these two models differs much from 
each other. Such as it is shown in Fig.6 and Fig.7, the simulation model two would be 
discovered earlier by radar network than the model one at the same penetration angle. After 
the model two was discovered for the first time, it was lost by the radar network for a long 
time, while the model one was detected continuously by radar network after its first being 
found.  
Above all, the static stealth performance assessment method still has some limitations. 
Conclusions drawn from the tests are listed as follows: 
1. Different circumferential scattering distribution can makes the aircraft has absolutely 
different stealth performance, even if they have the same circumferential average RCS; 
2. According to the stealth performance of aircraft with different circumferential scattering 
distribution, the average RCS of aircraft requirement could be appropriately relaxed. 
2.3 The assessment method based on the effectiveness of combat 
Based on the radar simulation and target signal simulation technology, the steps of 
assessment method based on the effectiveness of combat are listed: first of all, calculating 
the aircraft survival probability during the whole combat mission, then summarizing the 
effects of RCS characteristic on aircraft survivability and evaluating the stealth performance 
of aircraft. The rules of this method are the aircraft with higher survivability has better 
stealth performance. The assessment method based on aircraft effectiveness of combat has 
been investigated early abroad. Ball R E made deep studies into the RCS reducing 
technology which would improve the survivability of aircraft greatly. At the same time, 
some software corporations abroad developed many kinds of analysis software that were 
applied for analyzing survivability and vulnerability of aircraft. For example, several kinds 
of software developed by SURVIAC center could quantitatively and comprehensively 
evaluate the survivability and vulnerability of aircraft in the situation of one to one air 
battle. In China there are a great deal of research about the effects of aircraft RCS on its 
survivability have been done. For example, Zhang Kao and Ma Dongli proposed the method 
of calculating the survivability of stealth aircraft that carries out given mission. Aimed at 
analyzing the effects of reducing aircraft RCS on survivability of aircraft. 
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Assessment method based on the effectiveness of combat reflects the stealth performance of 
aircraft carrying out the given mission, but still has some limitations: firstly, this method 
couldn’t reflect the process and dynamic character of the stealth performance of aircraft 
during the whole mission. For example, the target ‘flashing signal’ caused by the different 
distributions of strong scattering source. Secondly, the assessment method based on the 
survivability could not reflect the character of multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic 
comprehensive stealth performance of aircraft, and it also ignores characters of the multi-
azimuth and multi-frequency electronic detecting environment. 
3. The multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic integrated stealth 
performance assessment method 
Because of the limitations of the existing assessment method told in chapter 2, it should 
build up a new assessment method for stealth performance of aircraft. This method could 
evaluate the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic comprehensive stealth 
performance of aircrafts, not just gives the evaluation conclusions based on the average RCS 
of target circumferential area, or that of some critical radar detecting areas. The aircraft with 
different scattering characteristic could meet requirements of different missions. In order to 
evaluate the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic comprehensive stealth 
performance of aircraft, it should build up the RCS scattering model and the multi-azimuth 
and multi-frequency dynamic detecting environment model when the aircraft carries the 
given mission, then make the assessment rules for analyzing the multi-azimuth and multi-
frequency dynamic comprehensive stealth performance of aircraft. 
3.1 The multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic comprehensive assessment 
models 
This section describes the building steps of the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic 
comprehensive assessment models in detail, the assessment model includes the typical 
complex dynamic detecting environment simulation model based on the given mission and 
the RCS scattering model of aircraft. 
3.1.1 The RCS scattering model of aircraft  
In order to build a model that could reflect the RCS scattering character of aircraft and use 
this model to analyze the stealth performance, we need to guarantee the accuracy of the 
model. 
Aircrafts executing different missions will encounter different detecting threat at different 
azimuths from land, sea, air and space. And even if using the same detector with the same 
working mode, the signal of aircraft the radar detected may still changes at any moment in 
the mission. So the method of building reduced-scale model of aircraft and doing 
experiments is considered. We can acquire the corresponding data for building up the 
scattering model of aircraft. The RCS database should include the data of aircraft RCS at 
different azimuths, under different frequencies. It is impossible to meet the needs of 
building the database by the way of building model and testing it because of the limitation 
of experiment condition. So the feasible way is to combine the data from both experiment 
and theoretical calculating. Fig 8 shows the detailed steps. 
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Fig. 8. Flow chart of building the RCS database 
 
 
Fig. 9. Schematic illustration of the aircraft scattering model 
The aircraft scattering model can be built up based on the adequate RCS data. The detailed 
steps of building up the aircraft scattering model are showed as Fig.9. The coordinate 
system in Fig.9 is defined just the same as aircraft body axes coordinate system for building 


X 
Y 
Z 
Front direction of aircraft 
O 
The direction of radar wave 
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up equation of motion, which follows the right-handed screw rule.   and   are two 
parameters of radar detecting wave.   is defined as the angle between the project of radar 
wave on the XOY plane and the X-axes.   is defined as the angle between the project of 
radar wave on the YOZ plane and the Y-axes.   and   together decide the location of radar 
wave in aircraft body axes coordinate system. 
The planform of one aircraft scattering model is shown as Fig10. Fig11 shows the test RCS 
curve of this model. We can see from the two figures that the model’s RCS scattering character 
is consistent with experiment result which looks like a butterfly. This building method of the 
RCS scattering model is feasible. The method of building a scattering model is an innovation, 
which accurately reflects the RCS scattering character of the aircraft under different 
frequencies. This method could be applied for analyzing different kinds of stealth aircraft. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Planform of the Aircraft Scattering Model 
 
 
Fig. 11. Circumferential Test RCS curve of Aircraft 
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3.1.2 The typical complex dynamic detecting environment model 
The typical detecting environment is different when the aircraft executes different missions. 
So if we want to evaluate the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic comprehensive 
stealth performance of aircraft, we must consider the typical complex detecting 
environment. For example, when an aircraft is executing a penetration mission, the main 
radar detecting thread is from the head or tail direction of aircraft. 
The detection environment of warfare is becoming more complex, so it is extremely difficult 
to describe it completely and accurately. By studying the performance of radar detection 
systems, we can summarize the typical detection environment. Here are the main elements 
to describe the typical complex and dynamic detection environmental model including two 
types, one is the main tactical applications, such as (1) characters of the two sides of combat. 
(2) Threat which the opposing sides may meet. (3) Interference and anti-interference 
measures of the opposing sides. The other is the related information of electronic equipment 
in typical detection environment, such as: (1) Number of detectors. (2) Spatial distribution of 
detectors. (3) Density of the detectors (time domain). (4) Parameters of the detector’s signal. 
(5) Frequency and scope of the detector’s signal. (6) The power of detector. (7) Working 
mode of detector. Using these model parameters above, we can accurately describe the 
typical complex dynamic detection environment when aircraft carries a specific mission. 
3.2 The multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic comprehensive stealth 
assessment rules 
As mentioned above, the existing assessments method is based on the average RCS of 
aircraft. In order to make sure that the aircraft stealth performance assessments conclusions 
are applicable, which can be used to guide the new type of stealth aircraft design and stealth 
performance analysis, we should consider the specific tasks the aircraft carries. When 
performing different tasks, the aircraft may encounter different typical detection 
environment. So it is not reasonable to use the same stealth performance assessment rules. 
Therefore, this section will establish the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic 
integrated stealth performance assessment rules based on the given mission. Based on 
specific combat mission, the assessment rules should be built up by analyzing various types 
of detection threat the aircraft may encounter and the influence of the aircraft scattering 
characteristic. Based on the conclusions got from the assessment rules above, we can 
compare and analyze the stealth performance of different aircrafts which perform the same 
task. The task-based aircraft multi-azimuth and multi- frequency dynamic integrated stealth 
performance assessment rules should satisfy two conditions: 
1. Assessment rules should reflect the character of specific tasks carried by aircraft. For 
example, the stealth performance assessment rules for penetration aircraft should reflect 
the character of penetration task firstly. In different stages of penetration task, the 
influence of the aircraft survivability and successful mission probability is different. For 
example, the first time when penetration aircraft is found by radar (or radar network) 
decides how many times the aircraft would probably be attacked by enemy firepower. 
When penetration aircraft was first discovered by radar network, the distance from the 
penetration destination determines whether the plane could use the remote attack 
weapon. Therefore, the establishment of penetration stealth performance assessment 
rules should be combined with the penetration characters, so that the evaluation 
conclusions reflect the differences of stealth performance among different aircraft when 
executing penetration. 
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2. The conclusion got from the assessment rules should be able to reflect the scattering 
character of aircraft. For example, during the process of penetration, aircraft mainly get 
detecting thread from its front azimuth by various types of detectors in the enemy air 
defense. If the aircraft goes through the first line of air defense system undetected and 
continues to fly to the enemy's air defense system, it may also be detected by radars at 
its two side azimuths. Therefore, when establishing stealth performance assessment 
rules, we should focus on the stealth performance of the front and two side azimuths of 
aircraft. The stealth performance of penetration aircraft is changing all the time. 
Therefore, the assessment rules should not only combine with combat characteristics of 
the penetration mission, but also need to consider the dynamic scattering character of 
penetration aircraft. 
4. The effects of different aircraft circumferential RCS scattering characters 
The aircrafts with different circumferential scattering characters is suitable for different 
combat missions, caused by various configuration design parameters. The stealth 
performance evaluation conclusions of aircraft with different circumferential RCS scattering 
characters can provide reference for a reasonable layout design of new type of aircraft. This 
section will combine the multi-azimuth and multi-frequency dynamic comprehensive 
assessment rules developed in chapter 3 to analyze and evaluate the aircrafts with different 
circumferential RCS scattering characters. 
4.1 The new target integrated circumferential RCS scattering model 
4.1.1 The relevant model parameters  
There are several requirements which the model should meet for the new analysis method: 
1) quantified the overall and partial RCS scattering characters of target; 2) setting up the 
relations between each different radar detecting areas; 3) controlling the RCS scattering 
changing trends of model through inducing several model RCS scattering control 
parameters. Considering that the RCS value can reflect the quantified target scattering 
characters and the differences between the RCS values may up to the magnitude order for 
the different target azimuth, the average RCS value of target circumferential area is 
introduced as one of the RCS scattering characteristic parameters of model and the unit is 
dBsm, and its symbol is ave . 
The existing analysis method does not take the effects of the changing relations between 
different important radar detecting region on the target stealth ability into account. For 
example, the aircraft could be excellent in depth penetration mission, if it has lower RCS 
value at the front azimuth and higher RCS values at other azimuths. Moreover, if the stealth 
aircraft has lower RCS value at its two side azimuths compared with that for the rest 
azimuths, it can carry out penetration mission with a smaller horizontal distance arriving at 
the enemy bases. In order to build up the relations between different target important 
detecting areas, the new analysis method uses the average RCS value of target front 
important radar detect area as the basis. Furthermore, the average RCS values of another 
radar detecting areas are introduced into the model as the target local RCS scattering 
characteristic parameters and the corresponding symbols are i  (i=0,1,…). The subscript i 
represents the sequence of radar detecting areas. For describing the relations between the 
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target front and other direction important radar detecting areas, the new model defines a set 
of relational parameters. Their symbols are 
i
k  (i = 0,1,…) and can be written as: 
  0/i ik  
                                                      (1)  
where 0

represents the average RCS value of the target front important radar detecting 
area.  
 
            
Fig. 12. RCS curve corresponding to one type of stealth aircraft (Under the S wave band). 
 
 
Fig. 13. RCS curve corresponding to one type of aircraft (Under the S wave band). 
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Due to different stealth design parameters the UCAV X-45 and X-47 have, so they have 
completely different RCS scattering characters. Their RCS curves differ much from each 
other, as shown in Fig.12 and Fig.13. So the same set of RCS scattering controlling 
parameters can not be used to describe the dissimilar RCS curve patterns and control the 
RCS scattering changing trends of various new models well. There are two requirements for 
the RCS scattering control parameters: one is that it is not advisable to introduce too many 
RCS scattering control parameters, the other is the model can satisfy all kinds of stealth 
ability analysis requirements. For example, building up the target circumferential RCS 
scattering model with triangle pattern character as shown in Fig.2 needs two RCS scattering 
control parameters, which can meet the requirements of controlling RCS scattering changing 
trends and conducting target integrated stealth performance analysis. These parameters are 
LK  and AK  respectively, LK  and AK  can be expressed as: 
 /L a bK L L                                                (2) 
 / 360A FK A                                               (3) 
where aL and bL  are the side lengths of model with triangle circumferential RCS scattering 
character. The parameter LK can control the RCS scattering changing trends of target head 
and tail areas. By this way, it can satisfy the analysis requirements about the effects of 
different target head and tail stealth performance on its integrated stealth 
performance. FA represents the angular region of target front important radar detecting area. 
Likewise, the models with different FA values can meet the analysis requirements about the 
effects of different front important radar detecting areas on target integrated stealth 
performance. 
 
 
Fig. 14. RCS curves of different target RCS scattering models. 
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Fig.14 shows the models with various target circumferential RCS scattering characters and 
being built up by changing the values of LK and AK , when ave  is equal to -10dBsm. 
4.1.2 The model building method 
According to Fig.12, the detailed building steps of the new model are described in this 
section. First of all, defining the suitable target whole and local RCS scattering 
characteristic parameters and introducing several model RCS scattering controlling 
parameters according to the different target RCS scattering characters are necessary. So as 
it is shown from Fig.1, the average RCS value of target circumferential area and the 
heading direction within the angular region of 030  to 030  are introduced as the target 
entire and local RCS scattering characteristic parameters respectively. Their 
corresponding symbols are ave  and
—
0δ . LK  represents the ratio between long side and 
short side lengths. Secondly, different functions are used to describe the RCS curves of 
different radar detecting regions. The variable of curve function is angle value , its 
corresponding function value is length value R. But in the target RCS curve, the 
corresponding value of angle   is the target RCS value. Therefore, a transform between 
the coordinate length value R and the target RCS value is needed. Based on this 
transform, RCS value in any direction of the target can be expressed by: 
 
m in
( ) ( )
1
1
1
( )
1
N
ave
ave i N
i
i
i
R R
N
R
N
 
  


      (4)
 
where ( )R  denotes the R value in any target azimuth, iR  is one of the series values of R 
in any target important radar detecting areas and subscript i represents the sequence of 
these R values, ave is the average RCS value of target circumferential area or local radar 
detecting areas and min  represents the RCS value of the coordinate origin. The stealth 
analysis about the target local RCS scattering character should be included in the 
conclusions of target integrated stealth performance analysis. So the last step is dividing 
the target RCS curve into several parts according to the target RCS scattering characters, 
then using different functions to describe these parts respectively. By this way, the 
analysis conclusion about how the target local stealth performance affects its integrated 
stealth ability can be reached. All the functions for every part of the curve can be written 
as:  
 
min
( ) ( ) min
1
( )
1
ave
N
i
i
R
R
N
 
  

  

    
 (5) 
where ( )i   and ( )iR  are the target RCS values and R values respectively and corresponding 
to the target azimuth of  . The subscript i represents the sequence of target important radar 
detecting areas. 
The functions corresponding to Fig.12 can be expressed as: 
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min min
( )
min min
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( )
2 cos
0
(180 ) (180 )
(360 ) 360
1 91
( )
2 sin
(180 ) (360 )
(360 ) 360
L
ave
Limit
Limit Limit
i Limit
ave
Limit Limit
Limit
K
Sum
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or
Sum
or

  
 
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  
 
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                            (6) 
90
0 1
1
2 cos 2 sin
Limit
Limit
L
K
Sum

          
where ave is the average RCS value of target circumferential area, min  represents the RCS 
value of the coordinate origin,  is the radar detect angle and LK  is the model RCS 
scattering controlling parameter. 
4.2 Examples and discussions 
In this section, the new kind of target circumferential RCS scattering models will be built 
according to Fig.12 and Fig.13. Before that, disposing several radars in different azimuths 
of enemy base. Combing relevant dynamic models and integrated stealth analysis rules 
can give the detailed integrated stealth analysis conclusions. In these examples, aircraft 
flight altitude is 1000m and flight velocity is 500m/s. The aircraft carries out the 
penetration mission along a straight flight course at the azimuth of 90 degrees. The 
azimuths of these radars are 0, 30, 45, 60, 90, 120, 135 and 180 degrees respectively. A 
comparison is made between the integrated stealth performance of these two serial 
models are given blow. 
4.2.1 Rectangular RCS scattering models 
Combining the new modeling methods described in Section 4.1.2 and the relevant stealth 
performance analysis requirements, the serial models with absolutely different RCS 
scattering characters are modeled. 
The values of relevant model RCS scattering parameters are 
ave
=-10dBsm and 0dBsm and 
LK =0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 respectively. Fig.15 and Fig.16 compare the average radar detecting 
probability of these serial models. Fig.15 shows that when ave is equal to -10dBsm, the RCS 
scattering characters of these three models differs much from each other. Among these 
models, the one corresponding to 
L
K =0.5 has the highest average radar detecting 
probability. When LK =1.0, the corresponding model will have much lower average radar 
detecting probability. When LK = 0.5, the radars located in the two sides of the enemy base 
will have much higher detecting probability than that for LK =1.0. So when ave is around -
10dBsm, the condition of LK =1.0 can make the penetration aircraft with rectangular RCS 
scattering character have excellent sidewise stealth ability. Then the aircraft can carry out 
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the penetration mission with a small transverse distance arriving at enemy base. The 
average radar detecting probability rises remarkably, when ave goes up to 0dBsm. 
 
 
           
Fig. 15. Comparison of radar detecting probability corresponding to serial models  
( ave =-10dBsm). 
 
 
       
Fig. 16. Comparison of radar detecting probability corresponding to serial models 
( ave =0dBsm). 
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LK  
Radar 
series 
number 
Lost target 
number First
T  
Stable 
tracking number 
Tracking 
duration 
Ȑsȑ 
0.5 0 1 289 1 315 
0.5 1 1 201 1 291 
0.5 2 1 174 1 263 
0.5 3 1 161 1 225 
0.5 4 1 167 1 159 
0.5 5 1 162 1 223 
0.5 6 1 175 1 261 
0.5 7 1 290 1 313 
1.0 0 2 194 1 139 
    2 139 
1.0 1 2 110 1 174 
    2 174 
1.0 2 1 87 1 436 
1.0 3 1 79 1 389 
1.0 4 1 89 1 315 
1.0 5 1 81 1 385 
1.0 6 1 89 1 433 
1.0 7 2 196 1 141 
    2 142 
2.0 0 2 1 1 142 
    2 300 
2.0 1 2 1 1 105 
    2 346 
2.0 2 2 1 1 137 
    2 399 
2.0 3 2 1 1 197 
    2 469 
2.0 4 1 1 1 765 
2.0 5 2 1 1 202 
    2 474 
2.0 6 2 1 1 142 
    2 402 
2.0 7 2 1 1 147 
    2 304 
Table 2. Relevant radar detecting data of serial models ( ave =-10dBsm) 
Table 2 lists the radar detecting data of this serial models. The data shows that when  
ave =-10dBsm, the lost target number will increase and FirstT  will decrease with the increase 
of LK . Suppose that the aircraft will counter the threat of enemy firepower only when it is 
continuously found by radar more than a certain time threshold and the corresponding 
notation is LimitT . If the time threshold is 200 seconds, when LK =0.5, 1.0 and 2.0, the 
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corresponding valid stable track number are 7 , 5 and 8 respectively. So when LK =1.0, the 
model has the least chances of meeting with enemy firepower. 
 
LK  
Radar 
series 
number 
Lost 
target 
number 
FirstT
Stable 
tracking 
number 
Tracking duration 
0.5 0 1 242 1 409
0.5 1 1 156 1 381
0.5 2 1 132 1 347
0.5 3 1 122 1 303
0.5 4 1 131 1 231
0.5 5 1 123 1 301
0.5 6 1 133 1 344
0.5 7 1 244 1 406
1.0 0 1 86 1 721
1.0 1 1 4 1 685
1.0 2 1 1 1 626
1.0 3 1 1 1 569
1.0 4 1 1 1 509
1.0 5 1 1 1 568
1.0 6 1 1 1 625
1.0 7 1 88 1 717
2.0 0 2 1 1 250
  2 966
2.0 1 2 1 1 201
  2 1003
2.0 2 1 1 1 221
  2 1049
2.0 3 1 1 1 1390
2.0 4 1 1 1 1347
2.0 5 1 1 1 1389
2.0 6 2 1 1 255
  2 1053
2.0 7 2 1 1 255
  2 970
Table 3. Relevant radar detecting data of serial models ( ave = 0dBsm) 
The data in Table 3 shows that when ave  =0dBsm, the duration of aircraft being stable 
tracked rises obviously and the valid stable tracking number also increases. It is also learned 
from the data that the time of models first being found by radar corresponding to LK =1.0 
and 2.0 will be much earlier. Therefore, the data shows that the RCS scattering controlling 
parameter ave has big effects on the integrated stealth performance of serial models. 
4.2.2 Triangular RCS scattering models 
The serial models with triangular RCS scattering characters are established according to the 
methods described in section 4.1.1. The meanings of ave , LK and AK  have been told in 
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section 4.1.1. The values of LK  and AK  are taken as LK =1.5、2.0 and AK  = 1/12, 7/72 and 
1/9 respectively. Fig.6 and Fig.7 show the comparison of average radar detecting probability 
between these serial models.  
 
             
Fig. 17. Comparison of radar detecting probability of  serial models  
( ave =-10dBsm, LK =1.5). 
 
 
Fig. 18. Comparison of radar detecting probability of serial models  
( ave =-10dBsm, LK =2.0). 
A
v
er
ag
e 
ra
d
ar
 d
et
ec
ti
n
g
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
Radar series number 
A
v
er
ag
e 
ra
d
ar
 d
et
ec
ti
n
g
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
Radar series number 
www.intechopen.com
 
Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
298 
Fig.17 shows that when ave =-10dBsm and LK = 1.5, the model with RCS scattering 
parameters AK =1/9 has lower radar detecting probability than both the models for 
AK =1/12 and 7/72 respectively. The radar detecting probability curves in Fig.18 show that 
when LK =2.0 and AK  adopts different values, the average radar detecting probability of all 
these serial models are decreased. Especially for the situation of AK  =7/72, the decreasing 
range is the maximum one. Both the two models corresponding to AK = 7/72 and 1/9 
respectively have lower radar detecting probability in their two sides than that in their 
heading direction. Especially when the RCS scattering controlling parameter AK  =7 /72. 
 
LK  
Radar series 
number 
Lost target 
number First
T  
Stable 
tracking number 
Tracking 
duration 
 
1.5 0 1 1 1 378 
1.5 1 1 1 1 299 
1.5 2 1 1 1 279 
1.5 3 1 1 1 269 
1.5 4 1 1 1 684 
1.5 5 1 1 1 270 
1.5 6 1 1 1 281 
1.5 7 1 1 1 380 
2.0 0 2 120 1 161 
    2 773 
2.0 1 2 37 1 197 
    2 1020 
2.0 2 2 16 1 224 
    2 1244 
2.0 3 2 9 1 243 
    2 1476 
2.0 4 1 17 1 2097 
2.0 5 2 10 1 243 
    2 1489 
2.0 6 2 17 1 226 
    2 1259 
2.0 7 2 121 1 165 
    2 799 
Table 4. Relevant radar detecting data of series models㸦 ave =-10dBsm， AK =7/72㸧 
Table 4 lists the relevant radar detecting data corresponding to the situation for the RCS 
scattering controlling parameters ave = -10dBsm and AK  =7/72 and LK  adopts different 
values. 
The data in Table 4 shows that when ave = -10 dBsm, the models with RCS scattering 
parameter LK = 2.0 will have more chances of being tracked by radar and the duration of 
radar stable tracking will be longer than the models corresponding to LK =1.5.  
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5. The effects of different aircraft RCS curve peak characters 
Analyzing rules about effects of the aircraft RCS curve peaks with different shape on 
penetration stealth performance reasonably, is meaningful. These rules could be references 
for both the concept penetration aircraft's stealth configuration design and making effective 
aircraft RCS reduction plans. 
5.1 The target RCS curve peak numerical simulation model 
5.1.1 The relevant model parameters 
The RCS curve peaks on the target circumferential RCS curve are formed by the total RCS of 
aircraft scattering sources, which are located in different radar detecting directions. The RCS 
curve peaks with different shape would cause different effects on the aircraft penetration 
stealth performance. 
There are two requirements for the target RCS curve peak numerical simulation model: 
(1)The changing trends of RCS curve peak scattering characteristic can be controlled (2) The 
analysis requirements about effects on penetration dynamic stealth ability, which are caused 
by kinds of RCS curve peak scattering characteristic changes, can be satisfied. 
 
 
Fig. 19. The RCS curve peaks with different shape 
The two RCS curve peaks with different shape in Fig19 show that RCS curve peak value and 
RCS curve peak azimuth-width are the main factors, which control the changing trends of 
RCS curve peaks. Changing the number or azimuth of aircraft scattering sources both can 
alter the RCS curve peak value or RCS curve peak azimuth-width. Rules about effects on the 
penetration dynamic stealth ability, which are caused by changes of the RCS curve peak 
value and RCS curve peak azimuth-width, could be references for reasonable stealth 
configuration design. As mentioned above, it defines two target RCS curve peak numerical 
simulation model parameters to control the changing trends of model's scattering 
characteristic, one is the peak value controlling parameter, the symbol is Max . The other is 
the peak azimuth-width controlling parameter, the sign is Width . This article also defines a 
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set of RCS curve peak location parameters, corresponding signs are i  (i=0,1, 2...), the 
subscript i represents the sequence of RCS curve peaks, which are located on the target 
circumferential RCS curve. As analyzing the rules about effects on aircraft penetration 
stealth ability, which are caused by changes of RCS curve peak scattering characteristic, 
influences of target scattering characteristic in another aircraft azimuth, should be 
eliminated. This article sets the RCS value in another model azimuth, as a constant value 
and less than the RCS peak value. As mentioned above, this article introduces the scattering 
characteristic controlling parameter, which is corresponding to another model azimuth, the 
symbol is  . 
5.1.2 The model building method 
Defining the model parameters according to section 5.1.1, the detailed model building 
method is told as below: (1) Defining the variable model parameters, according to the 
analysis requirements about influences on the aircraft penetration stealth ability, which are 
caused by different RCS curve peak scattering characteristic. For example, the RCS curve 
peak value would be reduced by the decrease of aircraft scattering sources. For analyzing 
the corresponding effects on the penetration stealth ability, it can build up a series of models 
with different RCS curve peak value, by changing the RCS curve peak value controlling 
parameters ( )i Max (i=0,1,2...), the subscript i represents the sequence of RCS curve peaks on 
the target circumferential RCS curve. Therefore, it can define ( )i Max  as the variable model 
parameters. (2) Introducing the scattering characteristic controlling parameters and RCS 
curve peak location parameters into the model, then determining the value of these 
parameters. For example, according to the case that there are two RCS curve peaks with 
6°azimuth-width, which are located on -30°and 30°azimuth of aircraft front area 
respectively, it can define the RCS curve peak azimuth-width controlling parameter: 
( )i Width =6°(i=0,1) and the RCS curve peak location parameters: i (i=0,1), 00 30  , 
0
1 30   . (3) Fixing up the value of scattering characteristic controlling parameter (  ), 
which is corresponding to another model azimuth.  
5.2 Examples and discussion 
This section builds up a series of target RCS curve peak numerical simulation models with 
different peak value or azimuth-width. By testing and analyzing these models, influences of 
RCS curve peak value or RCS curve peak azimuth-width on the dynamic stealth ability are 
generalized. 
5.2.1 Influences of RCS curve peak characters 
For evaluating effects on the integrated stealth performance of penetration aircraft, caused 
by different target RCS curve peak characters. According to Fig.19, this section builds up 
series of models, with same circumferential RCS characters, but different RCS curve peak 
characters. The circumferential RCS character controlling parameters of these models are: 
ave =-10dBsm, LK =1.0, and the RCS curve peak azimuth-location parameters are: 0  =45°, 
1 =135°, 2 =225° and 3 =315°. Table 1.lists another RCS curve peak character controlling 
factors. 
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 ( )j Max
 Ȑj=0,1,2,3ȑ ( )j Width  Ȑj=0,1,2,3ȑ 
Model 1  10 dBsm 2° 
Model 2 10 dBsm 4° 
Model 3 10 dBsm 6° 
Model 4 20 dBsm 2° 
Model 5 20 dBsm 4° 
Model 6 20 dBsm 6° 
Model 7 30 dBsm 2° 
Model 8 30 dBsm 4° 
Model 9 30 dBsm 6° 
Table 5. The RCS curve peak controlling factors 
Simulation conditions of this example are: 
flight condition: flight altitude H=1000 m; flight velocity V=200 m/s, flight azimuth (relative 
to enemy base) f = -40, -20, 0, 20 and 40 degrees; distance to penetration destination 
L=400Km. 
condition of radar network : Table 2 lists positions of every ground to air radar (GR) in the 
network and location of the penetration destination (Basement). 
 
Name Longitude Latitude 
GR1 119.6330 23.5667 
GR2 121.550 24.0667 
GR3 120.4830 22.7 
GR4 121.5330 25.0330 
GR5 121.6170 24.0167 
GR6 121.05 25.0667 
GR7 121.9667 24.8 
Basement 121.5 25.0 
Table 6. Positions of radar and destination 
Table7 lists the radar network detecting results of this serial models, corresponding to 
f = -20 degree. 
From Table7 we find that, Width  and Max  have different effects on the integrated stealth 
performance of penetration aircraft. Firstly, if Width takes a fixed value, with the rise of 
Max , FirstT  will decrease and target "flashing signal" will weaken ( ( )f FindT  increases and 
( )l LoseT  decreases). Furthermore, when Width  has a bigger fixed value, effects caused by 
increase of Max  would be more obvious. Adversely, if Width  takes a small value, namely, 
the azimuth-width of target RCS curve peak is narrow, Max  has little effect on the 
integrated stealth performance of penetration aircraft. Secondly, if Max  takes a fixed value, 
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FirstT  will decrease and the target "flashing signal" will weaken, with increase of Width . 
Similarly, when Max  has a bigger fixed value, effects caused by increase of Width would be 
more obvious. Lastly, when one of Max and Width takes a big fixed value, the other 
increases, effect on putting off FirstT , caused by increase of Width  is more obvious. 
 
 FirstT ( )f FindN ( )f FindT ( )l LoseN ( )l LoseT
Model 1 209.4 1 150.5 1 559.1 
  2 281   
Model 2 173.6 1 222.3 1 523.1 
  2 281   
Model 3 173.6 1 258.3 1 475.1 
  2 293   
Model 4 209.4 1 186.5 1 523.1 
  2 281   
Model 5 173.6 1 258.3 1 487.1 
  2 281   
Model 6 137.7 1 330.2 1 427.1 
  2 305   
Model 7 209.4 1 186.5 1 523.1 
  2 281   
Model 8 137.7 1 294.2 1 487.1 
  2 281   
Model 9 101.8 1 366.1 1 427.1 
  2 305   
Table 7. Radar network detecting results of serial models 
The rules for reducing aircraft scattering sources and improving integrated stealth 
performance of penetration aircraft can be got from above conclusions: 
1. reducing Max  firstly for putting off FirstT . 
2. plan about strengthening target "flashing signal" is:  it should reduce Max  firstly and 
Width  secondly, when Max takes a big value. However, when Max  is small, it should 
reduce Width  firstly.  
3. there is no need to reduce Max too much, if azimuth-width of RCS curve peak is 
narrow. 
5.2.2 Influences of superposing RCS curve peaks  
Because of the stealth design plan: "parallel leading-edge" and "parallel trailing-edge", the 
RCS curve peaks created by wing edges, could be located on the same azimuth. For 
evaluating effects of the plan, this section builds up two models, corresponding to "before 
superposing" and "after superposing" respectively (see Fig.10 and Fig.11). Circumferential 
RCS controlling parameters of these two models are: Max = -20dBsm, LK =1.0, and the RCS 
curve peak controlling factors are: 
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model one: 0 = 057 , 1 = 063 , 2 = 0180 , 3 = 0297 , 
4 = 0303 ; ( )j Width = 02 ; ( )j Max =10dBsm, (j=0,1,2,3,4) 
model two: 0 = 060 , 1 = 0180 , 2 = 0300 ; 1( )Max =10dBsm, 0( )Max = 2( )Max =13.01dBsm; 
( )j Width = 02  (j=0,1,2). 
Simulation conditions are the same as the example in section 5.2.1  
Table8 lists the radar network detecting results corresponding to f = 020 , 00  and 020 , 
respectively. These results show that, due to superposing RCS curve peaks, not only FirstT  is 
reduced a little, but also the target "flashing signal" is strengthened. Namely, the integrated 
stealth performance of penetration aircraft can be enhanced by superposing RCS curve peaks. 
 
f
 
 FirstT ( )f FindN ( )f FindT ( )l LoseN ( )l LoseT  
-20° 
Model 1 
742.4 1 197.8 1 202.1 
 2 57.7   
Model 2 
740 1 195.9 1 243.9 
 2 20.2   
0° 
Model 1 
284.2 1 435.7 1 67.9 
2 196.1 2 92.3 
3 123.8  
Model 2 
230.2 1 363.5 1 218 
2 172.2 2 92.3 
3 123.8  
20° 
Model 1 
250.1 1 325.8 1 57.5 
2 566.6  
Model 2 
250.1 1 325.8 1 57.5 
2 566.6  
Table 8. Radar network detecting results of two models  
6. Conclusions  
The conclusions about integrated stealth performance of penetration aircraft, based on a 
reasonable assessment method, are meaningful for both new type of stealth penetration 
aircraft design and efficient penetration tactics making. This paper proposes a new 
integrated stealth performance assessment method for penetration aircraft, which 
constitutes of the target RCS numerical simulation model and dynamic assessment model. 
This method can assesses effects on the integrated stealth performance of penetration 
aircraft, caused by different target circumferential RCS characters and RCS curve peak 
characters. As a fruit, three examples in this article show that:  
1. The target RCS numerical simulation models, performing different circumferential RCS 
characters or RCS curve peak characters, could satisfy various assessment requirements 
for the integrated stealth performance of aircraft. 
2. Better configurations, which can improve integrated stealth performance of penetration 
aircraft, could be got from the laws for effects of different target RCS characters.  
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As a new method, it can be applied in the integrated stealth performance of aircraft 
assessment field. To get more credible assessment conclusions, the more accurate target RCS 
numerical simulation model and dynamic assessment model should be introduced.   
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